
















                                                            
1 The term ‘duty’ is used in this paper in a sense that is interchangeable with cognate terms such as 
‘responsibility’ or ‘obligation’. It used to denote a normative requirement or restriction placed on someone’s 





                                                            
2 To see what Sophia is like go to https://www.hansonrobotics.com/sophia/ 
3 As Gunkel 2018b, p 116 points out, the gesture was not completely unprecedented. The Japanese have 
recognized a non-legal kind of robot citizenship in the past for artificial creatures such as Paro (the robotic seal). 




                                                            
5 The argument has some similarities with the ‘no-relevant-difference’ argument presented by Schwitzgebel and 
Garza (2015). But their argument is not grounded in the behaviourist view and is open to multiple possible 











                                                            
6 Kant was famously unwilling to accept that animals had moral status and drew a sharp distinction between 
practical reason (from which he derived his moral views) and theoretical reason (from which he derived his 
epistemological/metaphysical views). But others who have adopted a Kantian approach to philosophy have been 
more open to expanding the moral circle, e.g. Schopenhauer (on this see Puryear 2017). It is also worth noting, 
in passing, that the position adopted in the text has another affinity with Kantianism in that, just as Kant tended 
to reduce the metaphysical to the epistemological, ethical behaviourism tends to reduces the ethical to the 
epistemological. The author is indebted to an anonymous reviewer and Sven Nyholm for helping him to 
understand how Kant’s reasoning relates to the argument defended in the text. 
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on	metaphysical	properties	that	cannot	be	directly	assessed.	For	example,	the	most	popular	theories	of	moral	status	claim	that	it	is	because	we	think	others	are	conscious,	or	have	high	level	cognitive	capacities,	or	are	persons	and	have	interests,	that	we	owe	them	certain	duties.7	The	ethical	behaviourist	points	out	that	our	ability	to	ascertain	the	existence	of	each	and	every	one	of	these	metaphysical	properties	is	ultimately	dependent	on	some	inference	from	a	set	of	behavioural	representations.	Behaviour	is	then,	for	practical	purposes,	the	only	insight	we	have	into	the	metaphysical	grounding	for	moral	status.			The	concept	of	‘behaviour’	should	be	interpreted	broadly.	It	is	not	limited	to	external	physical	behaviours	(i.e..	the	movement	of	limbs	and	lips);	it	includes	all	external	observable	patterns,	including	functional	operations	of	the	brain.	This	might	seem	contradictory,	but	it	is	not.	Brain	states	are	directly	observable	and	recordable;	mental	states	are	not.	Even	in	cognitive	neuroscience	few	people	think	that	observations	of	the	brain	are	directly	equivalent	to	observations	of	mental	states.	They	may	well	infer	correlations	between	those	brain	patterns	and	mental	states,	but	they	verify	those	correlations	through	other	behavioural	measures.	For	example,	when	a	neuroscientist	says	that	a	particular	pattern	of	brain	activity	correlates	with	the	mental	state	of	pleasure,	they	work	this	out	by	asking	someone	in	a	brain	scanner	what	they	are	feeling	when	this	pattern	of	activity	is	observed.	They	bootstrap	from	the	behavioural	to	the	mental	to	the	neural.	This	primacy	of	the	behavioural	is	often	overlooked	in	popular	conversations	about	cognitive	neuroscience	(Hare	and	Vincent	2016;	Pardo	&	Patterson	2012;	Bennett	&	Hacker	2003;	Bennett,	Dennett,	Hacker	&	Searle	2007).		In	short,	then,	the	reason	why	one	should	accept	ethical	behaviourism	is	that	it	is	an	essential	feature	of	day-to-day	ethical	practice:	inferences	from	behaviour	are	the	primary	and	most	important	source	of	knowledge	about	the	moral	status	of	others;	if	we	did	not	rely	on	these	inferences,	the	identification	and	protection	of	moral	status	would	be	impractical.			
                                                            
7 For a comprehensive discussion of the potential metaphysical grounds for moral status, see Jaworska and 
Tannenbaum 2018. For specific discussions of consciousness, preference-satisfaction and personhood as 
grounds of moral status see Sebo 2018; Singer 2009; Regan 1983; and Warren 2000. For a discussion of the 




                                                            
8 An anonymous reviewer asks: what if it was a confirmed zombie? The ethical behaviourist would respond that 
this is an impossible hypothetical: one could not have confirmatory evidence of a kind that would suffice to 
undermine the behavioural evidence. 
9 One potential consequence of ethical behaviourism is that it should make us more skeptical of theories of 
moral status that purport to rely on highly uncertain or difficult to know properties. For example, some versions 
of sentientism hold an entity can be sentient without displaying any outward signs of sentience. But if this is 
correct, radical uncertainty about moral status might result since there is no behavioural evidence that could be 
pointed to that could confirm or disconfirm sentience. An ethical behaviourist would reject this approach to 
understanding sentience on the grounds that for sentience to work as a ground for moral status it would have to 
be knowable through some outward sign of sentience. For a longer discussion of sentience and moral 













                                                            
10 A skeptic of evolution (e.g. a proponent of intelligent design) might dispute this, but if one believes in an 
intelligent designer then arguably one should perceive less of a morally significant difference between the 
efficient causes of humans and robots: both will be created by intelligent designers. That said, a theistic 
intelligent designer would have distinctive properties (omniscience, omnibenevolence) and those might make a 












                                                            
11 If anything the opposite might be true. Theists might wish to ground moral status in non-observable 
metaphysical properties like the presence of a soul, but such properties run into the same problems as the strong 
form of sentientism (discussed in footnote 9). There are other possible religious approaches to moral status but 
religious believers confront similar epistemic limits to non-believers in the practical implementation of those 
approaches and this constrains how they can interpret and apply theories of moral status. 
12 Connected to this, an anonymous reviewer also points out that Kant (unlike many modern Kantians), in the 






                                                            
13 It might also be the case, as an anonymous reviewer points out, that our historical forebears conveniently 
overlooked or ignored the moral relevance of performative equivalency because doing so served other (e.g. 
economic) interests. 
14 It should also be noted that the historical mistreatment of groups of human beings would call into question 
other grounds of moral status such as ontology and efficient cause. So history does not speak against the 












                                                            




                                                            
16 That said, the performative equivalency view is not necessarily in tension with the relational view because the 
fact that people want to give robots names, invite them into their homes, and make them human-like in other 
ways is probably what drives people to create robots that are performatively equivalent. The author is indebted 




                                                            
17 Schwitzgebel and Garza (2015) have an extended discussion of AI-fragility (or the lack thereof) and what it 
might mean for moral status. They initially agree with the position adopted in this article but also suggest that 
certain aspects of machine ontology might warrant greater moral protection. 
18 Contrariwise, if replaceability undermines the need for certain kinds of moral protections, then perhaps we 
need a new set of moral norms for entities that are easily replaceable. But this new set of norms would then 
















                                                            
19 Article 12 of the UNCRPD recognises the right to equal recognition before the law of persons with disabilities 
and includes, specifically, the right to recognition of legal capacity (roughly: the capacity to make decisions on 
their own behalf). 
20 For an example of how this objection might play out, consider the controversy that Rebecca Tuvel’s article 
‘In Defence of Transracialism’ (2017) provoked when she argued that transgenderism and transracialism could 













                                                            
21 Bryson may think there are other moral/ethical benefits that outweigh these costs in the case of humans — it 
is not clear from her writings. What is clear is that she thinks that human well-being trumps robotic well-being. 
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(Savulescu’s	preferred	method	of	pre-implantation	genetic	diagnosis	has	its	epistemic	limits);	and	the	third	is	that	the	PPB	places	too	high	a	burden	on	potential	procreators,	particularly	women.22	Thus,	the	tendency	is	to	think	that,	as	applied	to	human	procreation,	the	PPB,	at	best,	identifies	something	that	is	morally	supererogatory;	and,	at	worst,	not	defensible	at	all.		But	how	does	it	fare	when	applied	to	robotic	procreation?	Contrary	to	what	one	might	think,	it	may	be	less	controversial	in	that	case	than	in	the	human	case.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	the	most	compelling	objections	to	the	application	of	the	PPB	to	human	procreation	—	the	excessive	burden	argument,	and	the	epistemic	limitation	argument	—	carry	much	less	weight	when	applied	to	robotic	procreation.	Consider	Christine	Overall’s	criticisms	of	the	PPB.	She	argues	that	Savulescu	unduly	ignores	the	practical	impact	that	the	PPB	would	have	on	women.	If	followed,	it	would	require	women	to	forego	the	good	of	conception	via	sexual	intercourse,	and	instead	opt	for	IVF	combined	with	pre-implantation	genetic	diagnosis,	which	is	both	expensive	and	carries	significant	medical	risks	(e.g.	multiple	gestations).	It	would,	as	Overall	puts	it,	be	forcing	women	to	conduct	a	‘massive	medical	experiment’	on	their	own	bodies	and	that	of	their	children	for	uncertain	gain	(Overall	2011,	127).			 Similar	concerns	do	not	arise	in	the	case	of	robotic	procreation.	Requiring	robot	manufacturers	to	create	robots	with	the	best	possible	life	will	undoubtedly	impose	burdens	on	them,	but	these	burdens	are	not	unreasonable.	The	decision	to	create	a	robot	is	entirely	voluntary,	and	ensuring	that,	of	the	possible	ones	that	could	be	created,	creating	the	robot	with	the	best	possible	life	(given	current	technological	limits),	will	not	require	one	to	forgo	other	decisive/overwhelming	goods,	or	result	in	a	problematically	gendered	distribution	of	risk	and	reward.	Furthermore,	many	of	the	epistemic	limitations	that	apply	to	human	procreation	would	not	apply	to	robotic	procreation.	The	link	between	genetic	constitution	and	the	overall	quality	of	life	is,	still,	relatively	uncertain.	There	are	some	genetic	endowments	that	carry	significant	health	risks,	but	beyond	clearcut	cases	the	ability	to	ensure	the	best	possible	life	from	genetic	
                                                            
22 It is also sometimes criticized for being redolent of eugenics. However, Savulescu would argue that there are 
significant moral differences between what he is proposing and the morally repugnant policies of historical 
eugenicists. He is not claiming that people ought to be sterilized or prevented from having children in the 
interests of racial or cognitive purity. He is focusing on the need to benefit potential offspring; not on harming 
or restricting potential parents. 
32	
testing	alone	is	limited.	Controlling	a	robot’s	programming	and	technical	constitution	will	be	much	more	feasible.	There	can	be	more	fine-grained	control	over	its	quality	of	life,	though	there	will	be	some	limitations	(e.g.	hacking,	unforeseen	social	or	natural	disasters).23			There	are	two	obvious	objections	to	the	use	of	the	PPB	in	the	case	of	robots.	The	first	is	that	there	is	no	meaningful	concept	of	well-being	or	welfare	that	can	be	used	to	assess	a	robot’s	quality	of	life.	Hence,	the	principle	cannot	be	applied.	This	objection	can	be	quickly	dispatched.	The	key	lesson	of	ethical	behaviourism	is	that	determining	whether	an	entity’s	life	is	going	well	or	going	badly	can	be	sufficiently	assessed	using	behavioural	criteria.	In	determining	the	welfare	of	humans,	there	is	a	tendency	to	focus	on	questions	like:	Are	they	learning?	Do	they	have	friends?	Are	they	physically	fit	and	able?	Do	they	have	a	sense	of	purpose?	Are	their	desires	being	fulfilled?	None	of	these	things	can	be	determined	by	direct	testing	of	an	individual’s	metaphysical	constitution.	All	of	it	must	be	determined	by	reference	to	the	individual’s	performances	and	representations.	A	robot’s	quality	of	life	can	be	assessed	in	a	similar	fashion,	again	using	a	performative	equivalency	standard.			The	second	objection	is	that	there	is	at	least	one	important	difference	between	human	procreation	and	robot	procreation.	If	one	decides	to	procreate	a	human	being,	then	one	has	no	choice	but	to	procreate	an	entity	with	significant	moral	status.	Human	infants	are,	by	necessity,	beings	with	such	status.	If	one	decides	to	procreate	a	robot,	then	one	does	have	a	choice.	One	could	choose	to	create	a	robot	that	lacks	significant	moral	status	(that	fails	to	meet	the	performative	threshold).	This,	in	fact,	is	one	of	Bryson’s	main	points	when	she	argues	that	we	should	avoid	creating	person-like	robots.		There	are,	however,	two	important	limitations	to	Bryson’s	strategy.	The	first	is	that	the	drive	to	create	robots	that	cross	the	performative	threshold	(which,	as	noted	above,	could	be	quite	low)	will	probably	prove	too	overwhelming	for	any	system	of	norms	(legal	or	moral)	to	constrain.	And	once	the	first	robot	crosses	the	performative	
                                                            
23 Matthijs Maas has suggested to the present author that the hacking risk is quite severe. As he sees it “if a 
robot capable of suffering gets hacked, this would allow the attacker to inflict massively scalable, unbounded 
suffering or indignity on the AI (e.g. by speeding up its clock-time, making it suffer subjective millennia of 
humiliation). The amount of suffering that could be inflicted on a robot is therefore much higher than that which 
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